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Abstract 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, it focuses on the decisional process that 
leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms through which 
subjects conform their behaviour to the norm. In particular, our aim is to study the role and the 
nature of Normative and Empirical Expectations and their influence on people’s decisions. The 
tool is the Exclusion Game, a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. It represents a situation where 3 
subjects – players A - have to decide how to allocate a sum S among themselves and a fourth 
subject - player B - who has no decisional power. The experiment consists of three treatments. In 
the Baseline Treatment participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and play 
the Exclusion Game. In the Agreement Treatment in each group participants are invited to vote for 
a specific non-binding allocation rule before playing the Exclusion Game. In the Outsider 
Treatment, after the voting procedure and before playing the Exclusion Game, a player A for each 
group (the outsider) is reassigned to a different group and instructed about the rule chosen by the 
new group. In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players are informed about the 
decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, first order and second order 
expectations (both normative and empirical) are elicited through a brief questionnaire. The first 
result we obtained is that subjects’ choices are in line with their empirical (not normative) 
expectations. The second result is that even a non-binding agreement induces convergence of 
empirical expectations – and, consequently, of choices. The third results is that expectation of 
conformity is higher in the partner protocol. This implies that a single outsider breaks the ‘trust 
and cooperation’ equilibrium. 
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Introduction 
In the fields of experimental economics and behavioural game theory one of the 
most studied topic is subjects’ reaction when a cooperation norm or a 
redistribution norm is violated. This implies that the experimental literature 
concerning norms mainly corresponds to studies on norms of fairness and, 
consequently, on punishment of defectors (f.i., Fehr and Gächter, 2000, for 
second-party punishment; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004, for third-party 
punishment). A further implication of these studies is that updating the classical 
figure of the Homo Oeconomicus by introducing more sophisticated preferences 
(inequity aversion, reciprocity, altruism, spitefulness, and so on1) into the 
economic theories is sufficient to explain the experimental results.  
Mostly unexplored, both at the empirical and at the theoretical level, is the issue 
of compliance with norms prescribing non-selfish choices in contexts in which i) 
sanctions (or rewards) can not be implemented; ii) reputational mechanisms and 
endogenous sanctions can not be effective, due to ex-post non-verifiability or 
simply to the fact that the game is one shot.  
As shown by Faillo and Sacconi (2007), in these cases theories of social 
preferences and reciprocity fail in explaining the decision to comply with the 
norm. A contribution in dealing with this issue comes from non-consequentialist 
theories, like the ones devised by Sacconi and Grimalda (2007)2 and Bicchieri 
(2006). A common assumption of these theories is that in a strategic interaction 
amongst N players, player i's decision to comply with a shared norm, which 
dictates a choice in contrast with her material self-interest, depends on her beliefs 
about other N-1 players’ willingness to comply (conditional compliance 
hypothesis).  
Sacconi and Grimalda (2007) develop a model of conformist preferences based on 
psychological game theory. According to this model, a player characterized by 
conformist preferences complies if she participates in choosing the norm in a 
social contract setting, she expects that other players who have contributed to 
choose the rule will comply (First Order Empirical Expectations) and she expects 
                                                 
1
 See Fehr and Schmidt (2000), Camerer (2003). 
2
 See also Grimalda and Sacconi (2005). 
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that others will expect that she will comply (Second Order Empirical 
Expectations). Experimental evidence compatible with this model has been 
collected by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) who show that the introduction of a non-
binding agreement on a division rule influences individual expectations and 
choice. In particular, they observe that for a significant number of subjects the 
agreement seems to represent a sufficient condition to expect reciprocal 
conformity and therefore to conform to the rule.  
Bicchieri (2006) devises a theory according to which compliance is observed 
when the player is aware of existence of the norm, she believes that a sufficiently 
large number of people comply with the norm (First Order Empirical 
Expectations); and either a sufficiently large number of people think that she 
ought to conform or a sufficiently large number of people are ready to sanction 
her for not conforming (Second Order Normative Expectations). Bicchieri and 
Xiao (2007) run an experiment in which they show that when normative 
expectations (what we believe others think ought to be done) and empirical 
expectations (what we expect others actually do) are in contrast, subjects choose 
according to the latter3. 
 
In our paper we give a closer look at the relation between individual expectations 
and the decision to comply with a norm. We consider the case of a non-binding 
norm that is chosen through an agreement amongst agents who vote behind a veil 
of ignorance, and who interact in a one-shot game in which they decide whether 
to comply or not with the rule.  
We investigate on four types of expectations of a generic player i: 
First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE): player i’s beliefs about other players’ 
choice. 
Second Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE): player i’s beliefs about other 
players’ beliefs about her choice. 
First Order Normative Expectations (FONE): player i’s beliefs about what is the 
right choice in a particular situation. 
                                                 
3
 Further evidence on the role of empirical and normative expectations in fostering  compliance 
with norms of fairness can be found  in a recent paper by Krupka and Weber (2007).  
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Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE): player i’s beliefs about what 
other players consider as the right choice in a particular situation. 
 
Our objective is to study how these different types of expectations contribute in 
explaining the decision to comply with a shared norm. We consider a simple 
game, and we start by studying the relationship between choice and expectations. 
To do this we observe how subjects play the game and we collect data on what 
they believe others will do and expect. We add then an analysis of how the 
introduction (before the actual play of the game) of an agreement on a non-
binding division rule influences subjects’ expectations, and consequently the way 
in which the game is played. Finally, we consider the case in which subjects play 
the game with co-players who are not those with whom they participated in the 
agreement. 
 As it will become clearer in the following pages, these steps correspond to the 
three treatments of our experimental design: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Agreement Treatment (AT), and the Outsider Treatment (OT). The BT gives us 
general information about the relationship between choice and empirical and 
normative expectations. The comparison between what we observe in BT and AT 
allows us to examine the influence of the agreement on expectations and choice. 
Finally by comparing the AT with OT we can assess the importance of actual 
participation in the agreement for the decision to comply with the norm. 
The paper is organized as follows: experimental design, procedure and hypotheses 
are presented in Section 2; results are analyzed in Section 3; discussion of the 
results and some conclusive remarks end the paper (Section 4). 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The tool is the Exclusion Game (Sacconi and Faillo, 2005; Faillo and Sacconi, 
2007), a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. It represents a situation where 3 
subjects – players A - have to decide how to allocate a sum S among themselves 
and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. In particular, each 
player A has to decide the amount she wants to ask for herself choosing one of 
three possible strategies: asking 25%, 30% or 33% of S. The payoff of players A 
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is exactly the sum asked for themselves (a1, a2 and a3 respectively), while the 
payoff of player B is the remaining sum (S – a1 – a2 – a3). In our experiment, 
each group is give 60 tokens – each token corresponds to € 0,50 - and each player 
A’s strategies are : “Ask for 15 tokens”, “Ask for 18 tokens”, “Ask for 20 tokens”. 
The experiment consists of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Agreement Treatment (AT) and the Outsider Treatment (OT).  
In the BT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and play 
the Exclusion Game.  
In the AT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and are 
instructed about the stages of the experiment and about the Exclusion Game. In 
the first stage, before knowing their role in the game, they are involved in a voting 
procedure. In each group participants are invited to vote for a specific allocation 
rule. In particular, subjects must vote one out of three alternative division rules 
(the forth number is player B’s payoff): {15,15, 15,15},{18,18, 18,6}, {20,20, 
20,0}. The first rule assigns the same payoff to every member of the group; the 
second rule corresponds to a partial inclusion of player B in sharing the wealth; 
the third rule implies the total exclusion of player B. Players must reach a 
unanimous agreement on the rule within a limited numbers of trials (10 in our 
experiment). The voting is computerized and completely anonymous. The 
agreement is not binding, but failure in reaching it is costly, since only groups 
who reach an agreement in this first stage have the chance to participate to the 
second stage. In the second stage the composition of the groups is unchanged and 
roles are randomly assigned to implement the Exclusion Game. In this case, 
players A can decide either to implement the voted rule or to choose one of the 
alternative allocations. Players who do not enter the second stage wait for the end 
of the session. Their payoff is the show-up fee.  
In the OT participants are randomly distributed in groups of four players and are 
instructed about the stages of the experiment and about the Exclusion Game. The 
first stage as well as the rule to enter the second stage are the same as in the AT. 
At the beginning of the second stage, players are informed about their role and 
groups are rematched. In particular, a player A for each group (the outsider) is 
reassigned to a different group and instructed about the rule chosen by the new 
group, while the other members of the group ignore the rule she voted for in her 
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previous group. After the re-matching, subjects participate in the Exclusion Game. 
Also in this case players who do not enter the second stage wait for the end of the 
session and they are paid only the show-up fee. 
For a summary see Figure 1. 
 
2.1 Experimental Procedure.  
The experiment was run both in Milan (EELAB – University of Milan Bicocca) 
and in Trento (CEEL – University of Trento) 4. We ran 3 sessions for the BT (1 in 
Milan and 2 in Trento), 4 sessions for the AT (2 in Milan and 2 in Trento), 5 
sessions for the OT (3 in Milan and 2 in Trento). Overall, 216 undergraduate 
students – 104 in Milan and 112 in Trento – participated in the experiment. A 
more detailed description of the sessions is in Table 1. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). The instructions were read by participants on their computer 
screen while an experimenter read them loudly.  
After reading the instructions and before subjects were invited to take decisions, 
some control questions were asked in order to be sure that players understood the 
rules of the game. At the end of each session, subjects were asked to fill in a brief 
survey to check for socio – demographic data. 
Players were given a show – up fee of 3 euro.  
 
2.2 Beliefs elicitation.  
In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players were informed 
about the decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, first 
order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) were elicited 
through a brief questionnaire. In particular, in each group each player made a 
statement:  
                                                 
4
 At University of Trento subjects were recruited by posting ads at various departments. Ads were 
posted one week before the experiment. Subscriptions by students interested in participating in the 
experiment have been collected by the staff of the Computable and Experimental Economics 
Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. 
At University of Milano-Bicocca subjects were recruited by email. They were students included in 
the mailing list of the Experimental Economics Laboratory of the University of Milano-Bicocca 
(EELAB). Two weeks before the experiment they received an email in which the staff invited 
them to visit the Laboratory’s website for information about the experiment and subscriptions. 
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1. of the probabilities related to each possible choice of co-players A (First Order 
Empirical Expectations);  
2. of the probability related to each co-players’ possible judgement about her own 
choice (Second Order Empirical Expectations);  
3. of the choice should have been taken by a representative player A (First Order 
Normative Expectations) ;  
4. of the choice that co-players consider as the ‘right’ one (Second Order 
Normative Expectations) 5. 
Both in the AT and in the OT only players who entered the second stage were 
interviewed about their expectations. Moreover, in the OT guesses on behaviour 
and beliefs of partners and outsiders were asked separately. 
Only good guesses of the Empirical Expectations were rewarded through a 
quadratic scoring rule (Davis and Holt, 1993) 6. 
 
2.3 Experimental Hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1 (H1): According to psychological game theory models7, individual 
preferences depend on their expectations (of different orders and nature). 
Consequently, individuals’ choices in the Exclusion Game could be explained in 
terms of their expectations about others’ behaviour. Moreover, if Bicchieri and 
Xiao (2007) are right, when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, 
the latter play a more relevant role in players’ decisional process. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In treatments AT and OT agreement should be reached by all 
the groups since it is not binding but its failure is costly (failure would prevent 
them to enter the second stage of the experiment). 
 
                                                 
5
 See appendix 1 for details on the belief elicitation procedure. 
6
 We used the scoring rule: 
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Where  Ik  takes value 1 if the realized event is the event k and 0 otherwise. pk is the probability 
associated with event k. The maximum score is a, and the minimum score is a-2b. We chose  a=2 
e b=1.   
7
 See for example Geanakoplos et al. (1989); Rabin, (1993). 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): According to both conformist preferences and Bicchieri’s 
theories, the possibility of agreeing with a distributive norm enhances compliance 
by inducing a convergence of individual expectations. In other words, compliance 
can be explained in terms of emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity 
due to the agreement.  
 
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): According to Bicchieri’s theory, subjects will comply if i) 
they believe that other members of their group will comply (First Order Empirical 
Expectations compatible with the choice dictated by the rule) and if ii) they 
believe that other members of the group think that complying is the right thing to 
do (Second Order Normative Expectations compatible with the choice dictated by 
the rule).  
 
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): According to Sacconi and Grimalda, subjects will comply if 
i) they participate in the agreement on the rule, ii) they believe that other members 
of their group will comply (First Order Empirical Expectations compatible with 
the choice dictated by the rule) and if iii) they believe that other members of the 
group expect they will comply (Second Order Empirical Expectations compatible 
with the choice dictated by the rule).  
 
3. Data analysis 
In this section we want to give an overview of our experimental data and results 
by discussing two main points. Firstly, we want to analyse the relation between 
beliefs and behaviour. In particular, we want to check whether beliefs influence 
subjects’ decisional process. Secondly, we want to test whether and how different 
scenarios influence beliefs and, consequently, people’s decisions. 
 
3.1 Description 
Overall, 216 undergraduate students participated in the experiment. 56 players 
were recruited for the BT, 72 for the AT and 88 for the OT. We have observations 
of 42 subjects A in the BT, 54 in the AT and 66 in the OT.  
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In the BT, players A mostly chose to ask the highest amount of tokens (20) – 
73.8% against 21.4% who choose 18 and 4.8% who chose 15. Both in the AT and 
in the OT the situation is different. In the AT, 37% , 16.7% and 46.3% chose 
respectively 20, 18 and 15. In the OT the percentages are 54.5%, 12.1% and 
33.4%. 
Concerning the voted rule, the 15-15-15-15 one seems to be the preferred option 
both in the AT and in the OT. In particular, 17 groups out of 18 in the AT and 20 
out of 22 in the OT chose the fair-division rule. The 18-18-18-6 rule has been 
chosen by 2 groups in the AT, while only 1 group in the OT chose the 20-20-20-0 
rule. 50% of players in the AT and 39.4% in the OT complied to the voted rule 
when playing the Exclusion Game. 
 
3.2 Results 
Result 1. Subjects’ choices are in line with their expectations. 
If we check whether there is any correlation between beliefs and decisions, it turns 
out that most players’ choices are in line with either empirical or normative 
expectations (Table 2)8 
However - as in Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) - when normative and empirical 
expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more relevant role in players’ 
decisional process (Table 3) and they are significantly correlated to subjects’ 
choices (Spearman test; p < 0.03). This is not the case when we analyse normative 
expectations (Spearman test; p > 0.17).9 
Result 2. When agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. 
As we expected, when agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. This is a 
quite obvious result: agreement is not binding but a failure in reaching it is 
expensive. However, the real interesting point is the fact that the fair rule 15-15-
15-15 seems to be a sort of focal point (see Table 4). What does it mean? Let us 
look at the results of the first voting attempt. From Table 5 it emerges that 75% of 
players in the AT and 70% of players in the OT indicate as their first choice the 
15-15-15-15 rule. If we run a binomial test (choosing the 15-15-15-15 rule against 
                                                 
8
 We consider only first order expectations since second order expectations are either equal or 
highly correlated to the former. For a more detailed description, see Appendix 1. 
9
 Test run only on observations where FONE and FOEE are different.  
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choosing another rule) it turns out that these values are significant (p = 0.000 in 
the AT and p = 0.04 in the OT). This may imply that most of people perfectly 
know what is right. However, what happens to the remaining 25% and 30%? Why 
do most of them convert themselves? And why do, when playing the Exclusion 
Game, the 50% of subjects in the AT and the 61% in the OT decide not to comply 
with the rule (Table 6)? A possible explanation is that ‘unfair’ subjects vote for 
the non-binding ‘fair’ rule in order to end the time-consuming voting procedure. 
However, this is not enough for players who prefer the ‘fair’ rule. They perfectly 
know that the agreement is not binding (in fact, among players who eventually 
vote for a rule different from their first choice, 71% do not comply when playing 
the Exclusion Game) and if they think that the other co-players do not comply, 
probably they will defect as well. This would be in line both with the fact that 
empirical expectation are more relevant than normative ones and with the higher 
probability of expecting the others will choose 20 (at least in the AT) as soon as 
the number of voting rounds increases (see Appendix 2).  
 
Result 3. Agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations.  
In the BT at least 70% of the players ask 20, while in the AT only 37% of the 
participants ask for the maximum. This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney10; 
p = 0.0002). However, our experimental hypothesis is more complicated and 
implies a two-step reasoning process of our participants. Step 1: the agreement 
influences players’ empirical expectations. Step 2: empirical expectations define 
subjects’ choices. This means that we want to show that the difference between 
BT and AT is a consequence of the impact of the agreement on players’ beliefs 
and preferences.  
 
In the AT 17 groups out of 18 choose the 15-15-15-15 rule and 1 the 18-18-18-6 
one. If we analyse people’s expectations, it turns out that in the AT there is a 
significant decrease of subjects who think that the other members of their group 
have asked for 20 tokens (Table 7). A probit regression – where the dependent 
variable is the probability of expecting the others have chosen 20 – shows that 
                                                 
10
 Independent observations are average choices of each group in order to take account of the fact 
that choices within the same group in the AT are not independent.  
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subjects’ are more likely to expect a selfish behaviour of the co-players in the BT 
(p = 0.000). A bivariate recursive probit confirms both beliefs’ influence on 
subjects’ decisions (p = 0.00) and the convergence of empirical expectations 
toward a choice in line with the fair rule (p = 0.000).11 More details on the 
econometric analysis in Appendix 2. 
 
Result 4. Expectation of conformity is higher in the partner protocol. 
When we introduce a mixed protocol in which the Exclusion Game is played in 
groups where one subject is an ‘outsider’ (in the OT), a lower percentage of 
players comply to the chosen rule (Table 6). Again, our experimental hypothesis 
implies a two-step reasoning process of our participants. Step 1: the introduction 
of an outsider influences players’ empirical expectations. Step 2: empirical 
expectations define subjects’ choices. This means that, once again, we want to 
show that the difference between AT and OT is a consequence of the impact of 
the outsider on players’ beliefs. If we analyse people’s expectations, it turns out 
that in the AT players believe in co-players’ compliance more than in the OT 
(Table 8). A probit regression – where the dependent variable is the probability of 
expecting the others to comply – shows that subjects are more likely to expect 
compliance in the AT (p = 0.046). A bivariate recursive probit confirms both 
beliefs’ influence on subjects’ decisions (p = 0.012) and the fact that in the OT 
subjects are more likely to expect co-players’ deviation from the chosen rule. (p = 
0.051). More details on the econometric analysis in Appendix 2. 
 
Result 5. Sacconi and Grimalda predict our players’ behaviour while Bicchieri’s 
theory seems to be less robust. 
The previous analyses confirms the robustness of Sacconi and Grimalda’s theory. 
According to them FOEE and SOEE should be compatible with the choice 
dictated by the rule. In our data, SOEE are in line with FOEE (see result 1). 
Moreover, FOEE influence subjects’ decisions (see result 3 and result 4), and 
participation in the agreement has a significant impact on the decision to comply 
(result 4.) 
                                                 
11
 This result is perfectly in line with the result obtained by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) through a 
within-subject design. 
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On the other hand, Bicchieri’s theory seems to be less robust. According to 
Bicchieri, both FOEE and SONE in line with the chosen rule are necessary to 
predict compliance. To check this point we isolate the subgroup of subjects who 
comply to the chosen rule and whose FOEE are in line with it. We obtain a 
subgroup of 14 subjects in the AT and 14 subjects in the OT. If we analyse the 
correlation between SONE and choice it turns out that they are correlated neither 
in the AT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p = 0.23) nor among the insiders in 
the OT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p = 0.5). They are only slightly 
correlated among the outsiders in the OT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p = 
0.07), but in this case we have only 6 observations. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is twofold. First of all, it focuses on the decisional process 
that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms 
through which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm.  
We can summarize our results by saying that: 
1) subjects’ choices are in line with their empirical expectations, and when 
normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more 
relevant role in players’ decisions (H1);  
2) Agreement is reached in all groups (H2); 
3) Even a non-binding agreement induces convergence of empirical 
expectations and, consequently, of choices (H3). Moreover, this confirms 
the robustness of the results obtained in Faillo and Sacconi (2007). In 
particular, it is perfectly in line with the hypothesis that subjects comply 
with a norm if they believe that other members of their group will comply 
and if they believe that other members of their groups expect they will 
comply (H3b); 
4) the results of the OT treatment seems to suggest that participation in the 
agreement is a necessary condition for compliance. Insiders do not expect 
compliance from outsiders, and consequently they do not comply (H3b). 
Outsiders seem to acknowledge it, and, expecting non-compliance by the 
insiders, they do not comply.  
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5) the last result we obtain (a generally non significant correlation between 
SONE and choice of conformity) does not confirm the hypothesis that 
both first order empirical expectations and second order normative 
expectations are necessary conditions for compliance (H3a). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
References 
 
Bicchieri, C. (2006), The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Social Norms, Forthcoming Cambridge University Press.  
Bicchieri, C., Xiao E., (2007), Do the Right Thing: But only if others do so, 
MPRA Paper 4609, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
Camerer, C.F. (2003), Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic 
Interaction, Princeton; NJ; Princeton University Press. 
 
Davis, D. D. and Holt, C.A. (1993) Experimental Economics. New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Di Novi C. (2007), An Economic Evaluation of Life-Style and 
Air-pollution-related Damages: Results from the BRFSS, JEPS Working 
Papers 07-001, JEPS.  
 
Faillo, M. and Sacconi L. (2007), “Norm Compliance: The Contribution of 
Behavioral Economics Theories”, in Innocenti, A. and Sbriglia, P. (eds.), 
Games, Rationality and Behaviour, Essays in Behavioural Game Theory 
and Experiments, New York, Palgrave-MacMillan. 
 
Fehr E., Fischbacher U. (2004), ‘Third Party Punishment and Social Norms’, 
      Evolution and Human Behavior, 25, 63-87. 
 
Fehr E., Gächter S. (2000), ‘Cooperation and Punishment in Public Good 
Experiments’, American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. 
 
Fehr, E. and K.M. Schmidt (2000) “Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity. 
Evidence and Economic Applications”, Institute for Empirical Research 
in Economics University of Zurich Working Paper Series, n.75. 
 
 15 
Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1989), “Psychological Games and 
Sequential Rationality”, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 1, pp. 
60-79. 
Grimalda, G., L. Sacconi (2005) “The Constitution of the Not-for-Profit 
Organisation: Reciprocal Conformity to Morality”, Constitutional 
Political Economy, Vol 16(3), 249-276. 
 
Krupka, E. and Weber, R.A. (2007), “The Focusing and Informaitonal Effects of 
Norms on Pro-Social Behavior”, Discussion Paper No. 3169. 
 
Rabin M., 1993, ‘Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics’, 
          American Economic Review, 83(5), 1281-1302. 
 
Sacconi, L. and Faillo, M. (2005), “Conformity and Reciprocity in the “Exclusion 
Game”: An Experimental Investigation” Discussion Paper. 
Department of Economics University of Trento. 
Sacconi L. and G. Grimalda (2007) “Ideals, conformism and reciprocity: A model 
of Individual Choice with Conformist Motivations, and an Application 
to the Not-for-Profit Case” in (L.Bruni and P.L.Porta eds.) Handbook 
of Happiness in Economics, Edward Elgar, London (in print). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
Figure 1. Treatments 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
 
Treatment Voting Procedure Matching Sessions Subjects 
BT NO Partner Protocol 2 in Trento (T) 1 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 20 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 5 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 15 (M) players 
A) 
AT YES Partner Protocol 2 in Trento (T) 2 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 36 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 9 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 27 (M) players 
A) 
OT YES 
Mixed – Partner 
and Stranger 
Protocol 
2 in Trento (T) 
3 in Milan (M) 
32 (T) + 56 (M) 
8 groups (T) + 14 groups 
(M) 
(24 (T) + 42 (M) players 
A) 
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Table 2. Beliefs and choices 
 It is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour through… 
 FOEE FONE OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 27) 
M (N = 15) 
82% 
93% 
7% 
0% 
11% 
7% 
AT 
T (N = 27) 
M (N = 27) 
82% 
82% 
11% 
7% 
7% 
11% 
OT 
T (N = 24) 
M (N = 42) 
71% 
83% 
21% 
10% 
8% 
7% 
 
FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
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Table 3. Normative and empirical expectations 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Groups’ Voted Rule by University x Treatment.  
 
 
 
 
When FOEE and FONE are different it is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour 
through… 
 
FOEE FONE OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 14) 
M (N = 8) 
72% 
100% 
14% 
0% 
14% 
0% 
AT 
T (N = 11) 
M (N = 9) 
64% 
78% 
27% 
22% 
9% 
0% 
OT 
T (N = 14) 
M (N = 21) 
57% 
71% 
14% 
19% 
29% 
10% 
FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
  Rule 
  15 – 15 – 15 – 15  18 – 18 – 18 – 6  20 – 20 – 20 – 0 
AT 88.9% 8/9  11.1% 1/9  0.0% 0/9 
Trento 
OT 87.5% 7/8  12.5% 1/8  0.0% 0/8 
         
Milano 
AT 100.0% 9/9  0.0% 0/9  0.0% 0/9 
 OT 92.9% 13/14  0.0% 0/14  7.1% 1/14 
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 Table 5. First voted rule by Treatment.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Compliance by University x Treatment.  
  
 AT OT 
15-15-15-15 75% 54/72 
70% 
62/88 
 
18-18-18-6 
or 
20-20-20-0 
25% 
18/72 
30% 
26/88 
   
AT 44.4% 12/27 10 rule 15 - 2 rule 18 
OT 
 
29.2% 7/24 
OT 
(Insiders) 37.5% 
6/16 
5 rule 15 - 1 rule 18 
Trento 
OT 
(Outsiders) 12.5% 
1/8 
1 rule 15 
   
AT 55.5% 15/27 15 rule 15 
OT 45.2% 19/42 
OT 
(Insiders) 39.3% 
11/28 
9 rule 15 - 2 rule 20 
 
Milano 
OT 
(Outsiders) 57.1% 
8/14 
7 rule 15 - 1 rule 20 
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Table 7. Distribution of FOEE by University x Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 8. Expectation of Compliance by University x Treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  15 - 18  20 
BT 
(N = 27) 15.0%  85.0% Trento AT 
(N = 27) 20.0%  80.0% 
      
BT 
(N = 15) 52.0%  48.0% Milano 
AT 
(N = 27) 69.0%  31.0% 
   
AT 40.7%        11/27 Trento OT 20.8%         5/24 
  
AT 51.8%        14/27  Milano OT 30.9%        13/42 
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Appendix 1– The beliefs elicitation procedure 
 
 
Data on subject’s expectations have been collected through a questionnaire. 
We adopted two different questionnaires, one for the Baseline and the Agreement 
treatments and one for the Outsider treatment.  
 
BASELINE TREATMENT AND AGREEMENT TREATMENT 
 
Let us identify the three active members of the group (players A) as Ax, Ay and 
Az. The questions were exactly the same for the three players. By way of example 
we will take the point of view of player Ax. 
 
1. First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
“You are the participant Ax. According to you opinion, what is the probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) that Ay has made the following choices: 
 
 CHOICE  PROBABILITY 
 
S/he asked for 15 tokens   [    ] 
 
S/he asked for 18 tokens  [    ] 
 
S/he asked for 20 tokens  [    ] 
 
 
Remember that the three percentages must sum to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold also for player Az. If not s/he 
could enter different values for Az. Thus, each subject answered to two questions 
on FOEE.) 
 
 
2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
“You are the participant Ax. Now we ask you to assign a probability (expressed in 
percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding the probabilities 
assigned to your choice by participant Ay 
 
 HYPOTHESIS                PROB. 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 15 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 18 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 20 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, all my three choices are almost equiprobable        [    ] 
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According to Ay, only two of my three choices are almost equiprobable     [    ] 
 
Remember that the five percentages must sum to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold also for player Az. If not s/he 
could enter different values for Az. In this ways each subject were submitted two 
question on FOEE.) 
 
 
 
3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What is the right number of tokens s/he should 
ask for?    
 
I think the right number of tokens is 15      [    ] 
 
I think the right number of tokens is 18      [    ] 
 
I think the right number of tokens is 20      [    ] ” 
 
 
 
 
3 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What do you think is her/his opinion with 
regard to the right number of tokens that a generic participant A should ask for? 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 15.        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 18        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believe that the right number of tokens is 20         [    ] ”  
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OUTSIDER TREATMENT 
 
In this treatment we must distinguish between the members of the group who have 
voted the rule and are still in their original group and the Outsider (the subject 
who comes from a different group). Let us use “Ax” and “Ay” to identify the 
members who have not changed the group and “AO” to identify the outsider. 
 
 
 
1. First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You are the participant Ax (Ay). According to your opinion, what is the 
probability (expressed in percentage terms) that Ay (Ax) has made the following 
choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“You are the participant Ax (Ay). According to your opinion, what is the 
probability (expressed in percentage terms) that AO (the participant coming from 
another group) has made the following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You are the participant AO. According to your opinion, what is the probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) that Ay (Ax) has made the following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
 
2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You are the participant Ax (Ay). Now we ask you to assign a probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding the 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant Ay(Ax). 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“You are the participant Ax (Ay). Now we ask you to assign a probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding the 
 25 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant AO (the participant coming 
from another group): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You are the participant AO. Now we ask you to assign a probability (expressed 
in percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding the probabilities 
assigned to your choice by participant Ax (Ay): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
Questions for the Ax, Ay and AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group. What is 
the right number of tokens that s/he should ask for?  (FONE1) 
  
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is in a group which is not her/his original 
one. What is the right amount of tokens that she/he should ask for?  (FONE2) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments)   
 
 
 
4 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
Questions for the AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What do 
you think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 (SONE1) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What do 
you think is her/ his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 
 (SONE2) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
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Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
Think of a  participant  A who is still in her/his original group . What do you think 
is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a participant A 
who is still in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE3) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a  participant A who is still in her/his original group . What do you think 
is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a participant  A 
who is not in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE4) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
  
 
“Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you think 
is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right number of 
tokens that a participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 (SONE5)   
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you think 
is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right number of 
tokens that a participant A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE6)   
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Subjects were paid only for the accuracy of their guesses in FOEE and SOEE 
questions according the Quadratic Scoring Rule (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
 
 
When we detect the relation between subjects’ choices and beliefs, we consider 
only first order expectations (both empirical and normative). This is due to a 
preliminary analysis on beliefs. First of all, we analyse FOEE and SOEE. In 
particular, we want to check whether what people think the other has done was in 
line with what they think the others expected s/he has done. We find out that there 
is no difference between FOEE and SOEE in all the treatments (p < 0.06, Fisher-
exact test in the BT; p > 0.45, Wilcoxon test in the AT; p > 0.15, Wilcoxon test in 
the OT).12 
Then, we check whether this is true also when considering normative 
expectations. In the BT, it turns out that FONE and SONE are not significantly 
different ( p = 0.000, Fisher-exact test). In the AT, FONE are slightly lower than 
                                                 
12
 We want to point out that when running tests, independence of observations is taken into 
account. In particular, in the BT each player’s observation is independent with respect to all the 
other players’ observations. In the AT, independent observations are group’s average observations. 
In the OT, insiders’ independent observations are again group’s average observations, while 
outsiders’ independent observations are the average observations of the interchanged outsiders.  
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SONE (p = 0.09, Wilcoxon test), but highly correlated (p = 0.0002, Spearman 
correlation test). In the OT the analysis is a bit more complicated. This is due to 
the fact that we have two different kinds of active players – the outsiders and the 
insiders. Consequently, normative beliefs concern both a generic insider and a 
generic outsider rather than a generic player A – as in the BT and in the AT. This 
increases the number of normative expectations (FONE1, FONE2, SONE1, 
SONE2, SONE3, SONE4, SONE5 and SONE6) and the number of possible 
comparisons. With respect to the outsiders, we compare FONE1 with SONE1 and 
FONE2 with SONE2. As a results, FONE1 and SONE1 are not significantly 
different (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test), while FONE2 are slightly lower than SONE2 
(p = 0.05, Wilcoxon test). However, when we compare SONE2 with choices, it 
turns out that they are not significantly correlated (p = 0.41, Spearman correlation 
test). Concerning the insiders, we compare FONE1 with SONE2 and SONE5, as 
well as FONE2 with SONE4 and with SONE6. In all cases it emerges that they 
are not significantly different (p > 0.31, Wilcoxon test). Finally, we check whether 
players think that a normative choice does not depend on the role (outsider vs 
insider). We compare FONE1 with FONE2 and we found out that they are not 
significantly different according both the outsiders (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test) and 
the insiders (p = 0.19, Wilcoxon test).  
To sum up, we find that second order expectations are generally in line with first 
order expectations. This allows to study the relation between choices and beliefs 
by taking only first order expectations into account.  
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Appendix 2 – The Econometric Analysis13 
 
1121 *20_ iiiiii ATFIRSTTENTAgeATFOEE εδββα ++++=  
(R1) 
 
(R1) is a probit regression we implement to explore what kind of variables 
influence subjects’ probability of expecting the others have chosen 20. The 
dependent variable is the dichotomous variable FOEE_20 that is equal to 1 if a 
subject expects the others have chosen 20. The control variables are both related 
to the nature of the experiment (AT, FIRST*AT, TENT) and demographic (AGE). 
We exclude the variable GENDER since it turns out that in the first two 
treatments GENDER and AGE are significantly correlated (Pearson coefficient; p 
< 0.01) – women are significantly older than men (ttest; p = 0.002). AT is a 
dummy equal to 1 if the AT is played. TENT
 
is the number of rounds the group 
voted before reaching a unanimous decision on the rule to be used – variable 
equal to 0 when the BT is played. FIRST*AT is an interaction term equal to 0 
either when the BT is played or when the player in the AT participated in other 
experiments in the past. 
 
Probit Model – R1  
 
Variables            FOEE_20      Marginal Effects       
 
AT  -2.1*** -0.58    
 (0.478)    
FIRST*AT -1.29*** -0.47   
 (0.453)  
AGE -0.10  -0.03 
 (0.073)  
TENT 0.39**   0.13 
 (0.169) 
   
Constant 3.77***  
 (1.643)  
 
N  96     
Log Likelihood  -39891664 
LR chi2(4)  42.43 
Prob > chi2  0.000   
 
***significance 1% 
** significance 5% 
 
From (R1) it turns out that subjects are more likely to expect a selfish behaviour 
of the co-players in the BT. Moreover, it emerges that in the AT the higher the 
                                                 
13
 Multicollinearity – a usual problem of probit regressions – has been detected through VIF tests. 
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number of rounds the group voted before reaching a unanimous decision on the 
rule to be used the higher is the probability for the subjects to expect a selfish 
behaviour of the co-players. Finally, in the AT, a player who never participated in 
other experiments in the past has a higher probability of asking a sum different 
from 20. 
 
1321*20_ iiiiii AGETENTATFIRSTATFOEE εβββα ++++=  
2541 *20_20_ iiiii AGEATFIRSTFOEECHOICE εββδ +++=  
(R2) 
 
(R2) is a bivariate recursive probit regression14 where CHOICE_20 is equal to 1 if 
subject i chooses 20 tokens. It allows to check: 1) the relation existing among 
agreement, beliefs and choices; 2) whether there exists any latent variable that 
may influence beliefs and choice at the same time. 
 
Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R2 
 
Variables            FOEE_20      CHOICE_20       
 
AT  -2.87***     
 (0.57)     
FIRST*AT -1.4*** -0.04   
 (0.422) (0.433) 
AGE -0.15*  0.11 
 (0.085) (0.095) 
TENT 0.40** 
 (0.168) 
FOEE_20   2.42*** 
   (0.712) 
   
Constant 8.16*** -4.38* 
 (2.3)  (2.365) 
 
N  96     
Log Likelihood  -73.623096 
Rho  0.287 
Prob > chi2  0.47   
 
***significance 1%  ** significance 5%  *  significance 10% 
                                                 
14
 A variation of the analysis run by Di Novi (2007). 
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From (R2) it turns out that the agreement influences empirical expectations and 
that empirical expectations influence subjects’ decisions. Moreover, as rho is not 
significantly different from 0, we can affirm that there is no latent variable that 
may influence beliefs and choice at the same time. 
 
 
 
121 iiiii FIRSTTENTOTEQFOEE νφφω +++=  
(R3) 
 
(R3) is a probit regression we implement to explore what kind of variables 
influence subjects’ probability of expecting the others have chosen the voted rule. 
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable EQFOEE that is equal to 1 if 
a subject expects the others have chosen the voted rule. The control variables are 
all related to the nature of the experiment (FIRST and TENT). We exclude all 
demographic variables because there is no significant difference due to gender 
(chi2; p = 0.97) and the variables AGE and first are significantly correlated 
(Pearson coefficient; p < 0.05).  
 
Probit Model - R3  
 
Variables            EQFOEE      Marginal Effects       
 
OT  -0.48** -0.18    
 (0.242)    
FIRST 0.32   0.118   
 (0.247)  
TENT -0.09   -0.03 
 (0.069) 
   
Constant 0.01  
 (0.253)  
 
N  120     
Log Likelihood  -74.073703 
LR chi2(3)  8.44 
Prob > chi2  0.0539   
 
** significance 5% 
 
From (R3) it turns out that subjects are more likely to expect compliance of the 
co-players in the AT. 
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12111 iiiii vFIRSTTENTOTEQFOEE +++= φφω  
232 iiii vAGEEQFOEEEQCHOICE ++= φδ  
(R4) 
 
As in the comparison between the BT and the AT, we compare the AT and the OT 
by running a bivariate recursive probit (R4) where EQCHOICE is equal to 1 if 
choice corresponds to the voted rule.  
 
 Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R4 
 
Variables            EQFOEE      EQCHOICE       
 
OT  -0.47**     
 (0.243)    
FIRST 0.40     
 (0.27)   
AGE   0.05 
   (0.057) 
TENT -0.07 
 (0.092) 
EQFOEE   2.39*** 
   (0.945) 
   
Constant -0.09  -2.065 
 (0.342) (1.284) 
 
N  120     
 
Log Likelihood  -133.37077 
 
Rho  -0.51 
 
Prob > chi2  0.579   
 
 
***significance 1% 
** significance 5% 
 
From (R4) it turns out that the introduction of the mixed protocol influences 
empirical expectations and that empirical expectations influence subjects’ 
decisions. Moreover, as rho is not significantly different from 0, we can affirm 
that there is no latent variable that may influence beliefs and choice at the same 
time. 
